Outrageous pricing is bad for economy’s competitiveness
by Brian Kantor, October 16 2012, 05:36 | 1 Comment(s)
(exactly what is happening at the DTI before the Competition Commission wherein you have such large stakes in Pumelela?)
SOUTH African Airways (SAA) is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Republic of South Africa, as is Airports Company South Africa (Acsa).
SAA has run out of cash and has been given authority to raise R6bn in debt guaranteed by taxpayers to keep flying.
Acsa, by contrast, is awash with cash. For the financial year to the end of March, it generated R2.9bn in cash flows on customer revenues of R5.8bn — compared with R1.7bn on revenues of R4.6bn the year before. Last year, SAA generated just R278m of cash flow on income of R22.8bn.
This very different state of affairs is not coincidental. Acsa’s gains have been the losses or sacrifice of revenues that SAA and other airlines have had to make in favour of Acsa’s tariffs. SAA is almost certainly Acsa’s largest customer — the collector of the bulk of the fees paid by airlines and their passengers for the use of Acsa’s airports. These fees have risen significantly in recent years and account for a large proportion of what we pay to fly. The revenues the airlines can collect from their passengers is constrained by competition between them. There is no such constraint on the charges Acsa can levy given its near monopoly over all the airports in South Africa.
Acsa has not been shy to exploit its pricing power and neither the regulator nor the Competition Commission has acted as much of a constraint on the exercise of this monopoly power. An increasing proportion of the gross price per passenger flight that the market for air travel will bear, is being collected by Acsa at the expense of the airlines.
This is an issue recognised in economics as the pipeline problem. If you own an oil well or a coal or iron-ore mine and somebody else owns the only pipeline to the port, you are at their mercy. The owner of the transport monopoly can extract all the surplus you might otherwise earn from your mining operations — which is why the mine owners would do well to either own the lines to the market or sign very long-term leases for their use on terms that make economic sense.
Failing that, they may have to rely on the mercy of the regulators, who may control tariffs. The regulators, however, may be inclined to exaggerate the returns required by the owners of very low-risk rail, pipelines and ports, and so allow them to charge more heavily than would be the case were the ports and the lines to compete actively with each other for business. There is every reason to suspect the regulators in South Africa of this bias.
The government has invested on the ground and in the air. The airline business is notorious for the poor returns provided for shareholders while passenger numbers have soared over the years. The major airlines would have done much better to have invested in airports as well as fleets of airliners — as indeed the government, which owns SAA and Acsa, has done. It therefore makes economic sense for the government to keep SAA going — if only to collect the fees Acsa is able to charge. It would also make sense for SAA to be competently managed so that it, as well as Acsa, could contribute dividends and taxes to government revenues and help relieve the burden on ordinary taxpayers.
Another wholly owned subsidiary of the government (and also awash with cash) is Eskom. With much higher prices for the electricity it generates and delivers, cash is pouring into the utility. Some ball-park numbers taken from Eskom’s financial statements will help to make the point. In 2009, Eskom’s cash flow from operations was R5.16bn on revenues from electricity sales of R53.09bn. In the year to March, cash flow from operations was R38.7bn on sales of R114.7bn. Since 2009, cash flows from operations have increased 7.5 times on sales revenues that have grown 2.16 times. This shows how freely the cash flows from all the established capacity when prices are allowed to increase as they have done.
Eskom continues to invest in new capacity. In 2009, it spent R44.7bn on new plants and securing fuel supplies. This year it has spent nearly R59bn for the same purpose. But given the abundant supplies of cash delivered from operations (R38.7bn this year), Eskom needed to raise only R16.5bn of additional debt in the past financial year compared with R30.5bn of debt raised in 2009. Eskom’s debt-to-equity ratio is falling significantly. No doubt this is to the satisfaction of Eskom’s management and the Treasury. But whether such extreme trends are good for the economy is moot.
What is the required return on capital invested in monopoly airports or electricity generators? The justification for higher prices is that they are needed to provide an economic return on the additional capital Eskom is investing in more plant and equipment. The principle of charging enough to cover the full costs of additional capital investment in additional capacity desperately needed by a growing economy is entirely valid. Prices have to be only high enough to cover operating costs as well as to provide an appropriate return on the additional capital invested.
A critical consideration is what return on capital is appropriate for this. The National Energy Regulator of South Africa regards a real return of 8% a year as appropriate for Eskom. Such a return is far too high given the nature of a monopoly utility business that is essentially a very low-risk activity. To aim at a return of about half of this would be about right for the owners of airports or power plants with monopoly rights. A real return of 4% is equivalent to a nominal return of about 10% or about 2% a year above the return on an South Africa long-dated bond. A risk premium of 2%, or about half the average equity risk premium, is consistent with a very low-risk enterprise. The global average real return for utilities of all kinds is about 4% a year.
My own spreadsheet on Eskom indicates that if it gets its preferred way for 90c/kWh, compared with the current 60c, the internal rate of return it would realise on its investment in new power stations, Medupi and Kusile, would be an extraordinary and outrageous 20% a year or more. The potential providers of alternative energy or of contributions to the grid will be cheering Eskom all the way to the bank.
Providing for a real return of 8% or more represents very expensive electricity or airports, even assuming best practice in the management of projects and supplies that may not be justified given such a comfortable financial environment. Inappropriately higher charges by state-owned enterprises, designed to realise much higher real returns on capital, while convenient for the boards and managers of Acsa and Eskom, are very bad news for the economy and its competitiveness. The much better alternative would be an agreed and much lower charge for capital — leading to lower prices for essential services and an insistence on best-practice cost management. It would mean less abundant cash flows for the utilities supplying the service and more debt on their balance sheets (guaranteed by the taxpayer), and so a more competitive economy.
It would also represent a pricing policy that is much fairer to current generations. Under the present practice of forcing savings from consumers through excessive charges for utilities, charges that should better be described as taxes, future generations will inherit the capital stock without the debt that they might appropriately be expected to be still be paying off over time.
Perhaps it might also lead to a fairer labour market in which strike action by relatively well-paid workers is apparently being encouraged by inroads being made on their real wages by ever-higher utility charges.
• Kantor is chief strategist and economist at Investec Wealth & Investment.
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